Jensen and Meckling (1976) 所提出的代理理論指出，經營者持股可降低經理人與股東間的利益衝突，而過去許多學者的研究亦驗證了獎酬計劃對經理人的激勵作用， 有助於經理人提升經營績效並持續創造利潤，使企業得以永續經營。本文針對1995年至2005年間共55家美國企業，探討企業在面臨財務危機時，獎酬計劃是否會左右CEO對企業的重整或清算決策，進而影響企業的存續。研究結果顯示，當股票選擇權的價值佔權益誘因的比例越高時，將提高CEO清算企業的可能性，加速企業生命的終結。另外，本文亦發現，更換CEO會提高財務危機企業重整可能性的證據薄弱。 Agency theory established by Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicates that executives stock ownership might reduce the conflict of interest between managers and stockholders. A number of prior research also examine the relationship between executive compensations and incentive effect, which are helpful to enhance performance and create profit continually, and thus in turn firms are able to have perpetual prosperity. This paper examines whether compensations influence restructuring and liquidation decision for 55 financial distressed firms in the period 1995-2005. Research finding suggests that the higher proportion of value of stock options to equity incentives in CEO’s compensation, the more liquidation decision CEO make, which would accelerate the extinction of firm. In addition, the result also shows weak support for the increasing possibility of restructuring decision when CEO is changed.
