朱子倫理體系之考察

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Title:	朱子倫理體系之考察
Other Titles:	A Study on Chu-Hsi''s Ethical System
Authors:	鄭素伊 Chung, So-Yi
Contributors:	蔡仁厚 Tsai, Jen-Hou 東海大學哲學系
Keywords:	朱子;朱熹;倫理體系;他律道德;心性論;理氣論;工夫論;德行倫理學 Chu-Hsi;Zhu-zi;Ethical System;Heteronomous Ethics;Human mind and nature;Li and Ch''i;Cultivation of Virtues;Virtue Ethics
Date:	2000
Issue Date:	2011-05-25T09:43:16Z (UTC)
Abstract:	提要本論文考察朱子之倫理體系。在學術界中對朱子的道德哲學已有許多廣泛而深入的研究；然學者們的研究方法，往往是以朱子思想發展及演變為主的歷史式的考察（縱貫研究法），或者是列舉朱子學說的各種論點，即範疇式的研究（橫貫研究法）。本論文是從朱子的道德觀中，抽出關鍵性的論點，釐清各論點之間的關係及脈絡。因此，本文所探討的範圍限於朱子晚年較為穩定的論點，故在時間的範圍上，沒有縱貫研究法之深遠。且因本文只抽出有關朱子道德問題的相關論點，故論點之種類，亦沒有橫貫研究法之廣泛。筆者在本論文裡，企圖顯現朱子哲學（尤其是在道德問題上）的各種論點，有其內在的邏輯結構。在此目的下，將朱子的道德觀首先分解為心性論、理氣論及工夫論三段，該是合乎自然。朱子心性論是探討道德主體如何能夠實現道德；理氣論是說明道德本體之客觀、形上根據；工夫論是討論道德主體如何實踐道德之方法，以實踐來彌補主觀心性論和客觀理氣論之差距。本論文首章成為一篇甚長的導論，考察「倫理系統」之含意及方法。從討論中西倫理學重點之不同出發，探究儒家之兩大系統，然後顯示朱子的道德觀就屬於儒家之「他律道德系統」。首章之主要目的在談及朱子道德哲學的時代意義。即證明朱子的思想除了在中國儒家傳統裡，自有開出並完成一派完整的系統的意義之外，還具有其他意義，即：在嚮往東西思潮交流的今天，朱子倫理系統能夠提供給現代西方倫理學一些互相匯通的思想線索。第二章到第四章各討論朱子的心性論、理氣論及工夫論。第二章首先澄清朱子對心、性和情之看法，並陳述朱子「心性情三分」之架構。這一章亦分析朱子的「人心道心說」及「仁說」，進一步地考察這兩個論點在朱子倫理體系之位置。第三章是說明朱子的理氣論。在道德形上必然根據的問題上，朱子有「理氣二分」之結構。筆者考察理氣之本質、關係及特性之後，探討人類和其他事物之理氣異同之問題，以顯現朱子的用心，乃是在於解決為什麼只有人能夠（且必須）實踐道德之問題。第四章是探討朱子的兩種工夫論，一是向內收斂心情之涵養察識（居敬）工夫，二是向外擴充知識之格物致知（即物窮理）工夫。在此簡略地說明這兩種工夫必須互發、相輔相成，才能達到朱子所謂「豁然貫通」之境界，即「下學與上達」的聖人之境界。第五章是本文之結論，整理朱子心性論、理氣論、工夫論之互相關聯。此亦可謂是朱子倫理體系之綜合，證明朱子各種論點之一致性。因朱子哲學範圍之龐大，又因筆者對歷史考證之不足，故本論文不能稱為朱子哲學之綜合研究，然以上述的基本架構為基礎，希望此後能夠發展對朱子倫理思想較深入的研究。 Abstract This thesis is to articulate the ethical systems of Chu-Hsi, a thirteenth century Chinese philosopher in Northern Song Dynasty. So far, many have already discussed Chu-Hsi’s moral philosophy both in depth and in breadth; yet, their method of research often belongs to one of two sorts. One is to investigate change and development of Chu-Hsi’s thought in historical and dialectical way, which could be called “vertical method.” The other is to categorically list Chu-Hsi’s thought-items in an encyclopedic manner, which could be called “horizontal method.” This thesis is only to discuss Chu-Hsi’s stable and established thoughts in his later years, hence lacks the historical depth of vertical method. Moreover, this thesis analyze, among Chu-Hsi’s many thoughts-items, only that are controversial yet congenial to shape Chu-Hsi’s moral philosophy; thus, it also lacks categorical breadth of horizontal method. This thesis tries to prove that Chu-Hsi’s seemingly scattered thoughts on moral questions weave nicely into one single moral philosophy. The basic framework of the moral philosophy contains three parts, which are much discussed Chu-Hsi’s theories on human mind and nature, on li-ch’i, and on the method of cultivating virtues. The theory of human mind and nature explains how humans are able to choose and practice moral virtues; the theory of li-ch’i, discusses the objectivity of morality in metaphysical terms; the theory of the method of cultivating virtues illuminates on the method which moral agents (humans) should follow in order to internalize and actualize everyday moral virtues. The first chapter of the thesis is a long introduction, speculating broadly the meaning and method of “ethical system.” The discussion starts from the difference between Chinese Confucianism and Western moral theories on what should be most stressed in a moral theory, viz., the external moral act or the internal moral disposition. The discussion later narrows down, outlining two ethical systems in Confucian tradition, namely, that of autonomous ethics and that of heteronomous ethics. Our discussion ends with suggesting that, in conformity to some contemporary scholars’ view, Chu-Hsi’s ethical system corresponds to the latter, the proof of which is to be seen on later chapters. The second chapter discusses Chu-Hsi’s thoughts on human mind and nature. It first clarifies Chu-Hsi’s view on human mind, nature, and emotion, then analyzes the structure connecting the three. This chapter also examines Chu-Hsi’s insights and theories on “Human mind and Moral mind” and “beneficence,” discusses further on how these two theories place themselves in Chu-Hsi’s ethical system. The third chapter explains Chu-Hsi’s theory of li (often translated as “Great Principle”) and ch’i (often translated as “Material Force”). On the question of objectivity and necessity of morality or virtue, Chu-Hsi has the theory of “different yet mutually related” li-ch’i. This chapter first considers the nature of li and ch’i, then analyzes the order and relationship between the two. We shall also outline the features of li and ch’i, and reflect on what li and ch’i ultimately amount for humans other beings. The fourth chapter discusses Chu-Hsi’s view on methods of cultivating one’s virtues, which can be broadly categorized into two kinds. One is inward cultivation, emphasizing stillness of the mind and introspection of the emotions. The other is external cultivation, expanding one’s knowledge by articulating the principles behind things and events that one comes across. We will briefly conclude that one must practice both of the two kinds, if one is to reach the sagehood which is traditionally described as “downward learning and upward reaching”(下學與上達), and Chu-Hsi later identifies with the state of “ sudden realization”（豁然貫通）. The fifth chapter is the conclusion of the thesis, summing up the mutual relationship between Chu-Hsi’s theories on human mind and nature, on li and ch’i, and on the method of cultivating one’s virtues. This is a crude yet synthesized view on Chu-Hsi’s ethical system, whose logical structure and other details could be further articulated by later works.
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